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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM
ARBITRATION
CONSOLIDATION OF ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS UNDER NEW YORK LAW
Symphony Fabrics Corporation entered into a contract with Barbara Dance
Frocks to supply Barbara with a quantity of a certain type of fabric, specifying
the chemical makeup and the dimensions of the fabric, to be delivered during an
approximate two month period during 1961. Two days later Symphony con-
tracted with Bernson Silk Mills to purchase the same type of fabric during the
same period. Both contracts embodied broad arbitration clauses, and differed
only in volume and price of the. fabric. Barbara discovered, after using the
fabric in its products, latent defects in it, and notified Symphony that it in-
tended to hold Symphony liable. Symphony notified Bernson of its intention
to hold that supplier liable for any damages caused Symphony due to the defects,
and refused to pay for the fabric. Bernson commenced an arbitration pro-
ceeding before the American Arbitration Association, and arbitrators were agreed
upon. Bernson demanded the purchase price, Symphony defending upon the un-
suitability of the fabric for its intended purpose, and demanding a presently incal-
culable amount of damages. Later Barbara began an arbitration proceeding
against Symphony. Symphony requested, in'writing to the Association, that the
proceedings be consolidated. The Association referred them to "an appropriate
court" for a consolidation order, stating that an arbitrator may consolidate
proceedings only with consent of all parties-Bernson objected. The Supreme
Court, Special Term, denied Symphony's motion for consolidation. The Appellate
Division, First Department, reversed, one justice dissenting, and certified a
question as to the propriety of its reversal to the Court of Appeals. On appeal
that Court did not answer the question, but held, the Supreme Court has the
power to consolidate arbitration proceedings even where the parties are not
identical, and the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in directing
consolidation. In the Matter of Symphony Fabrics Corp. [Bernson Silk Mills],
12 N.Y.2d 409, 190 N.E.2d 418, 240 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1963).
Resort to commercial arbitration is increasing, perhaps, as Justice Breitel
of the Appellate Division, First Department, suggests, because of court con-
gestion resulting from the growth in numbers of accident cases on court calen-
dars.' New York's arbitration statutes underwent a revision with the enact-
ment of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) which in many ways clar-
ified and in some ways broadened the older Civil Practice Act provisions 2 The
1. Breitel, The Quandry in Litigation, 25 Mo. L. Rev. 225, 230-31 (1960). See also
Weinstein, Notes on Proposed Revision of the New York Arbitration Law, 16 Arbitration
J. 61, 63-65 (1961).
2. See the discussion and notes on the Tentative Draft, Second Preliminary Report of
the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure 130 (1958). See generally Falls, Arbi-
tration Under the New Civil Practice Law and Rules in New York, 17 Arb. J. 197 (1962).
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CPA provisions had been a forerunner and model for other state acts, but were,
in 1957, termed a "hodgepodge of patchwork legislation. ' 4 As an adjunct and
alternative to commercial arbitration, the CPLR as well contains a simplified
procedure which attempts to provide both the advantages of arbitration and
of judicial proceedings.5
Judicial reasoning allowing consolidation of arbitrations under the Civil
Practice Act (CPA) may be summarized directly from the statutes involved:
"Arbitration... shall be deemed a special proceeding."o " [S]pecial proceedings
may be consolidated whenever it can be done without prejudice to a substantial
right."7 Implimentation of this two-step reasoning must be viewed in light
of a legislative purpose stated to be ". . . to provide for greater flexibility
and freedom for the prompt administration of justice within the sound dis-
cretion of the Court."8 Discretion has been exercised to grant the motion,
depending upon the facts of the cases, where the same parties were involved in
two or more arbitration proceedings.9 However, the statutes have been inter-
preted not to allow consolidation of an arbitration and a court action between
the same parties.' 0 Prior to the instant case, consolidation had not been allowed
where the parties to the two disputes were not identical. Reference is found
to an unreported New York Supreme Court decision that a party "could not
be compelled to arbitrate 'in a joint and single proceeding with petitioners which
have separate and independent agreements.'""' The Court of Appeals in the
instant case had no difficulty in arriving at an opposite conclusion as to the power
of the courts from the uncomplicated CPA sections involved.
The CPLR presents a much more difficult problem than did the CPA re-
garding consolidation of arbitration proceedings. Section 7502 (a) states:
3. Second Preliminary Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure
130 (1958). See also Weinstein, supra note 1, at 61.
4. Pirsig, Some Comments on Arbitration Legislation and the Uniform Act, 10 Vand.
L. Rev. 685, 690 (1957).
5. N.Y. CPLR §§ 3031-37. These sections were preceded by N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§§ 218-b, 218-c, enacted N.Y. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 863, discussed in Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
1666 (1962); Note, 36 St. Johns L. Rev. 110 (1961).
6. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act. § 1459.
7. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 96. The policy argument foe consolidation is expressed in
Peterfreund, Civil Practice, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1563, 1593 (1959).
8. C. W. Lauman & Co. v. State, 2 Misc. 2d 693, 695, 153 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (Ct.
CI. 1956). But, to the effect that consolidation of arbitrations may amount to changing
the terms of the agreement(s) between the parties, see In the Matter of Symphony Fabrics
Corp. [Bernson Silk Mills, Inc.], 16 A.D.2d 473, 474-76, 229 N.Y.S.2d 200, 202-04 (lst
Dep't 1962) (Eager, J. dissenting).
9. See, e.g., cases cited in instant case at 412, 190 N.E.2d at 419, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
See especially In the Matter of Stewart Tenants Corp. [Diesel Construction Co.], 16 A.D.2d
895, 229 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1st Dep't 1962) (per curiam), denying consolidation of arbi-
trations between the same parties where the agreements provided for hearings before
different tribunals, even though the issues involved were interrelated.
10. Big W. Constr. Corp. v. Horowitz, 278 App. Div. 977, 105 N.Y.S.2d 827 (2d
Dep't 1951).
11. In the Matter of Franc, Strohmenger & Cowan Co. [Designs by Stanley, Inc.],
14 Misc. 2d 370, 371, 135 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843 (Sup. Ct. 1954), quoting an earlier Supreme
Court, Special Term order of DiFalco, J. regarding the same litigation.
COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM
A special proceeding shall be used to bring before a court the first appli-
cation arising out of an arbitrable controversy which is not made by
motion in a pending action .... All subsequent applications shall be
made by motion in the pending action or the special proceeding.
It would seem to be the clear purport of this language that arbitration itself
is not a special proceeding. The note of the draftsmen to the original draft of
the section would appear to agree,' 2 as does Professor Weinstein.' 3 Professor
Weinstein, however, concludes that the arbitration becomes "a judicial [special?]
proceeding" once the first application is made to a court.' 4 This does not neces-
sarily follow from the wording of the section. A possible view is that a proceeding
collateral to or parallel with the arbitration is commenced by the application, but
that the arbitration itself remains independent and non-judicial.' 5 If the arbi-
tration is not a special proceeding, the consolidation section, section 602(a),
would not apply. But if it is a special proceeding, the power to allow consoli-
dation still does not follow as a matter of course. It is possible to interpret
CPLR article 75 as listing all of the further applications presentable to a
court which are contemplated by the last sentence of section 7502 (a). If these
remedies are deemed exclusive, a motion under section 602 (a) is not possible.' 6
The applications contained in article 75, to compel' 7 or stay arbitration, 8 to
confirm an award, 19 or to vacate or modify an award,20 are quite explicit. None
appears broad enough to embody consolidation. Although the application to
compel arbitration comes closest, it contains the requirement that "a valid agree-
ment was made or complied with."'2 ' That provision is interpretable as allowing
a form of specific performance of an express agreement. An express agreement
to arbitrate two separate controversies jointly would present no question of
consolidation. A question of the power to consolidate only arises where there is
no agreement to arbitrate two or more disputes together. Further, the appli-
cations to a court which are mentioned are of a particular nature. None is of
a sort which, if granted, would change the format or internal procedures of an
12. Second Preliminary Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Pro-
cedure 134 (1958).
13. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 66. See also Falls, supra note 2, at 202.
14. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 66.
15. The Court of Appeals, in 1924, expressed the interesting view that "an order
to proceed to arbitrate" consumated one special proceeding, while the arbitration as such
constituted "another special proceeding." Hosiery Manufacturers Corp. v. Goldston, 238
N.Y. 22, 25-26, 143 N.E. 779, 782-84 (1924). See discussion in Falls, supra note 2, at
204-05.
16. This argument is buttressed by the drafters' desire to make the arbitration article
of the CPLR completely independent. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 63: "Since it was
likely, too, that the arbitration provisions would be separately printed for [the non-lawyer
arbitrator's] guidance, an attempt was made to have the arbitration article stand as inde-
pendently as possible"
17. N.Y. CPLR § 7503(a).
18. N.Y. CPLR § 7503(b).
19. N.Y. CPLR § 7510.
20. N.Y. CPLR § 7511.
21. N.Y. CPLR § 7503(a).
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arbitration. Consolidation could well affect the manner in which an arbitration
is or must be conducted.
Section 602 (a), if relevant at all, causes further difficulty, stating "when
actions22 involving a common question of law or fact are pending before a court,
the court, upon motion,... may order the actions consolidated .... " CPA sec-
tion 96 was quite simple-special proceedings could be consolidated. If an arbi-
tration has become a special proceeding with the first application, some stretch of
the imagination is required to say that it is "before a court" in any normal sense
in order to satisfy section 602 (a). The section would seem to apply only to those
actions or special proceedings conducted before a court in their entirety.28
The drafters of the CPLR recognized in the use of arbitration a "desire to
settle ... differences out of court."24 Adopting this view, a court may be well
justified in restricting its interference to those activities specifically provided by
statute. Unless courts take an extremely liberal view of the pertinent CPLR
sections, and the changes from the CPA, the instant case may have been rendered
academic. Since no evidence of an intention to deny consolidation of arbitration
proceedings has been found,25 it may be assumed that this problem was over-
looked in the redrafting. The present trend of greater reliance upon arbitration
in commercial circles may make this an important oversight.
Richard S. Mayberry
CONFLICT OF LAWS
CONFLICT OF LAWS-TRADITIONAL LEx Loci DELICTI RULE REJECTED-
"MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS" RATIONALE DETERMINEs EFFECT OF FOREIGN
GUEST STATUTE
Two New York residents took a weekend automobile trip. It was to begin
and end in New York. In fact, their trip terminated in Ontario, Canada, when
defendant, driver and owner of the car, lost control causing the car to leave the
road and strike a stone wall. Plaintiff, a guest passenger, brought an action in
New York for personal injuries suffered as a result of defendant's negligence.
From a dismissal of the complaint by the New York Supreme Court on the
ground that Ontario's guest statute barred recovery1 and an affirmance thereof
22. N.Y. CPLR § 105(b), defining "action" to include special proceeding.
23. See N.Y. CPLR § 105(f) for the statutory definition of "court."
24. Second Preliminary Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Pro-
cedure 134 (1958).
25. No mention is found in any of the annual Committee reports, or in the Weinstein
article (supra note 1).
1. Highway Traffic Act, Rev. Stat. Ont. 1960, c. 172, § 105(2): "Notwithstanding the
provisions of subsection 1, the owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle
operated in the business of carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss
or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of, any person being carried in,
or upon, or entering or getting onto, or alighting from such motor vehicle."
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